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Abstract
Previous research showed that instructions about CS-US pairings can lead to fear of the CS even when the pairings are never
presented. In the present study, we examined whether the experience of CS-US pairings adds to the effect of instructions by
comparing instructed conditioning with and without actual CS-US pairings in a within-subject design. Thirty-two
participants saw three fractals as CSs (CS+1, CS+2, CS2) and received electric shocks as USs. Before the start of a so-called
training phase, participants were instructed that both CS+1 and CS+2 would be followed by the US, but only CS+1 was
actually paired with the US. The absence of the US after CS+2 was explained in such a way that participants would not doubt
the instructions about the CS+2-US relation. After the training phase, a test phase was carried out. In this phase, participants
expected the US after both CS+s but none of the CS+s was actually paired with the US. During test, self-reported fear was
initially higher for CS+1 than for CS+2, which indicates that the experience of actual CS-US pairings adds to instructions
about these pairings. On the other hand, the CS+s elicited similar skin conductance responses and US expectancies.
Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.
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Introduction
The publication of Rachman’s three-pathway theory on the
etiology of anxiety disorders [1] greatly stimulated research on the
acquisition of fear. In this theory, Rachman identifies observation
and instruction as important sources of fear next to the direct
experience of pairings between originally neutral stimuli (condi-
tioned stimuli; CSs) and aversive stimuli (unconditioned stimuli;
USs). For instance, someone might develop fear for spiders after
observing another person’s panic in response to spiders (learning
by observation) or after being told by that the bites of certain
spiders are lethal (learning by instructions). These ideas have been
supported by several retrospective studies in which observation
and instruction were identified as common sources of fear in
children [2–5].
Experimental studies further confirmed the role of observation
and instruction in the etiology of fear (see [6], and [7], for reviews
on these topics). For instance, Field and colleagues told children
that ‘‘Once upon a time, there lived a horrible scary monster
called Makis. Makis was 12ft tall with huge sharp fangs for eating
children with’’ [8] (p.1273). They observed that these instructions
led to increases in reported fear of the previously unknown
stimulus [8], negative implicit associations with that stimulus
[9,10], increased physiological responding to that stimulus [11],
and avoidance [9,11].
The studies of Field demonstrate that fear for a previously
unknown stimulus can be acquired based on instructions about the
properties of the stimulus (i.e., threatening information about the
stimulus). In addition, experimental fear conditioning studies have
shown that fear conditioning can result not only from the
experience of CS-US pairings but also from mere instructions
about the presence of those pairings in the future. For instance,
Olsson and Phelps (p. 825) showed participants a neutral face and
told them that they would ‘‘receive at least one and at most three
shocks paired with this face’’ [12]. This instruction led to enhanced
physiological responding to that face (see also the seminal work of
[13]).
So far, only two studies have looked at the joined impact of
direct experience and instructions [14,15]. In the study of Field
and Storksen-Coulson [14], 6- to 8- year-old children received
threatening information about an unknown animal. After this,
they had a negative experience with either this animal or a control
animal. The effect of a negative encounter with a novel animal was
stronger when it was preceded by threatening information about
this animal than when no information had been provided, while
the effects of only a negative encounter or only threatening
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information were similar. These results are consistent with
conditioning theories of phobias [16–18] which state a traumatic
experience yields stronger effects when the experience concurs
with previous beliefs on the CS-US contingency (i.e., compare the
effect of a car crash in someone who is already convinced that cars
are dangerous or in someone who thinks cars are generally safe).
On the other hand, a similar study in adults, in which participants
received computerized aversive CS-US pairings preceded either
by threat information or no threat information on the CS, did not
yield additive effects for the combination of experience and threat
information [15]. That is, participants who had received
threatening information about the CS showed higher initial fear
beliefs about the CS at the start of conditioning, but actual CS-US
contingencies did not further enhance these beliefs.
It still remains to be determined, however, whether actual CS-
US encounters actually add anything to instructions about the CS-
US contingency. To answer this question, one needs to manipulate
the presence of actual CS-US encounters while controlling for the
effect of instructions, CS and US experience and the predictive
power of the CS (CS-US contingencies). No prior study meets
these requirements. For instance, in the studies described above
[12,14,15], all participants received actual CS-US pairings for
each of the CSs. Moreover, in those studies, participants were
given general threat information about the CS (e.g., ‘‘this stimulus
is dangerous’’) [14,15] rather than instructions about a specific
CS-US contingency (e.g., ‘‘this stimulus will be followed by a
shock’’).
Intuitively, most of us would probably be inclined to believe that
experience of a CS-US pairing does add to the effect of mere
instructions about this pairing. Still, from a theoretical viewpoint,
this is not an obvious question to answer, nor is it a question with
an evident answer. Most importantly, existing models of associa-
tive learning allow for the possibility that instructions about
pairings lead to changes in behavior but are unconstrained as to
whether experience would add anything to the effect of
instructions.
First, association formation models posit that conditioned
responding depends on the formation of links in memory (e.g.,
‘‘A–B’’; see [19–21]). Typically, these links are assumed to stem
primarily from actual trial-by-trial experience e.g. [20,21].
Nevertheless, some proponents of these models have argued that
links in memory can be established in the absence of an actual US
and even an actual CS (e.g., Field, 2006, p.864) [22]. Their main
point is that evoking a representation of the CS-US contingency,
for instance through instructions, can be sufficient to install links in
memory and thus conditioned responding. However, it remains
unclear whether a subsequent encounter with the actual CS-US
contingency would further strengthen the CS-US link or whether
instructions alone can suffice to install CS-US link of asymptotic
strength.
Second, propositional models postulate that associative learning
is mediated by the formation of propositions (i.e., qualified
statements about relations between events; e.g., ‘‘A predicts B’’ or
‘‘A causes B’’; see [23,24]). These models assert that propositions
can be formed both on the basis of direct experience of the CS-US
pairs and on the basis of instructions about the CS-US relation.
Therefore, they would have little difficulty to accommodate to the
finding that experience does not add to instructions, provided that
instructions lead to a clear proposition with high truth value [23].
Still, propositional models can also be instantiated in such a way
that they would predict an added effect of actual CS-US pairings.
For instance, they could argue that direct experience of a CS-US
contingency enhances the truth value of a proposition relative to
purely instructed contingencies and therefore strengthens the
conditioned changes in behavior [23].
The fact that both propositional and association formation
theories can handle both types of results indicates that neither
theory is precise enough to derive specific predictions in this
context (see also [25]). Therefore, examining whether actual CS-
US pairings add to instructed conditioning would help to further
constrain associative learning theories and force them to make
explicit and testable assumptions about how the effect of
instructions and experience interact.
Examining the added value of actual CS-US pairings can
advance not only our theoretical understanding of (fear) condi-
tioning, but can also increase our insight in the development and
treatment of anxiety disorders. Previous research confirmed that
there are different pathways to the development of anxiety
disorders [5,26]. If, however, we observe that the actual
experience of CS-US pairings has effects on fear over and above
the effects of instructions, it would suggest that the different
pathways to fear are not entirely equivalent. Such a conclusion
would strengthen the idea that the treatment of anxiety disorders
should take into account the pathway via which fear originated.
On the other hand, if we find a strong effect of instructions without
evidence for the added value of experiencing CS-US pairings, this
would speak to the importance of the verbal pathway and thus of
prevention measures that are directed at this pathway, such as
alerting the parents of vulnerable children to the adverse
consequences of providing threatening information with stimuli
such as small animals, water, or heights [7].
In our study, we used a within-subjects design that allowed us to
manipulate the presence of the actual CS-US pairing while
controlling for CS experience, US experience, and instructions. At
the start of the experiment, participants received the same CS-US
instructions for two CS+s (CS+1 and CS+2). They were told that
both CS+s would be followed by a shock (US), whereas the CS2
would never be followed by shock. However, only CS+1 was
actually paired with the US. To ensure that participants believed
CS-US instructions for both CS+1 and CS+2, we included a
training phase during which CS+1 was paired with the US whereas
CS+2 was paired with a placeholder (picture of a lightning bolt)
instead of the US. The number of CS-US and CS-placeholder
pairings was the same. Through written instructions, we explained
that the goal of this phase was to get participants acquainted with
the experiment procedure. We told participants that we did not
want to expose them to too many shocks during training and
therefore, one stimulus (CS+2) would be followed by a placeholder
instead of the actual US. By giving participants an explanation for
the absence of the US after the CS+2, we hoped that they would
not simply dismiss the instructions about the CS+2-US relation as
invalid but would continue to evaluate the instructions for CS+1
and CS+2 as equally valid. Because CS+1 and CS+2 differed only
in terms of actual pairing with the US and not in terms of
instructions, we will refer to the CS+2 as the merely instructed CS.
After the training phase had ended, participants were instructed
that the experiment would now start for real and that, from now
on, all shocks (USs) would be actually delivered. During this phase,
from here on referred to as the test phase, no USs or placeholders
were actually delivered, however. This was important to assure
that participants would never experience the CS+2 being paired
with the US. The test phase was the critical phase for contrasting
responses to a CS for which actual CS-US pairings had been
delivered (CS+1) to responses to a merely instructed CS (CS+2).
During both training and test, responses to both CS+s were
contrasted with responses to a CS2 (i.e., a stimulus that was never
paired with the US or instructed to be followed by the US). At
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fixed time intervals during both the training and the test phases,
participants were asked to report US expectancy and fear for both
CS+s and the CS2. As such, we assessed participants’ cognitive
expectancy of the US (US expectancies) as well as their affective
status (self-reported fear) in response to the CSs. In addition to
these ratings, skin conductance responses (SCRs) were measured
on a trial-by-trial basis
Because participants were clearly informed that during training,
only CS+1 would be paired with the US, we expected that the
CS+1 would elicit more pronounced SCRs, US expectancy and
fear than the CS+2 and the CS2 during this phase. As mentioned
above, the test phase was the crucial phase in which we tested
whether actual CS-US pairings added to instructions on the CS-
US contingencies by contrasting responses to CS+1 and CS+2. If
experience of actual CS-US pairings matters, self-reported fear,
US expectancy, and SRC in response to CS+1 should still be
enhanced relative to CS+2 during the test phase.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate students registered for the study
through the on-line system of participant recruitment (Experime-
trix) of Ghent University. The sample was predominantly female
(6 men). Mean age was 21.81 (SD=2.18). Participants received
eight Euros in exchange for participation. Ethical approval for this
study was obtained by the Ethic Committee of the Faculty of
Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University.
Material
Apparatus. Hardware consisted of two PCs and a Coulbourn
Lablinc V (Coulbourn Instruments, Allentown, PA). One PC
controlled the experiment through Inquisit 3.0 (Millisecond
Software). The other PC was used to display and collect the
physiological data. The Inquisit PC was connected to two CRT
screens. One CRT screen was placed in the main lab space and
allowed the experimenter to follow the progress of the experiment.
The other screen, a 10246768 pixels CRT screen, was placed in a
separate test room. Besides the CRT screen, the test room also
contained the electrodes for the measurement of skin conductance
responses, and a constant current stimulator to deliver shocks. An
intercom system allowed communication between the experiment-
er in the main lab space and the participant in the test room.
Experimental stimuli. Three fractal figures (snowflakes)
that were easily discernible served as conditioned stimuli. The
allocation of these figures to the function of CS+1, CS+2 and CS2
was counterbalanced across subjects. The color of the fractals was
blue. The fractals were placed on a white square surface of
2006200 pixels (see Figure 1).
The US was an electrical shock delivered by a constant current
stimulator (DS7A, Digitimer, Hertfordshire, UK). This stimulus
was administered by two lubricated Fukuda standard Ag/AgCl
electrodes (1-cm diameter) to the right leg over the retromalleolar
course of the sural nerve. Onset/offset and timing of the shock
stimulus was controlled by a slave computer. The electrocutaneous
stimuli consisted of a series of 38 rectangular pulses (2 ms in
duration with an inter pulse interval of 6 ms) and had a total
duration of 300 ms. The intensity of the stimulus was individually
determined through a standard work-up procedure. The place-
holder stimulus consisted of a 1146114 yellow drawing of a
lightning bold that appeared in the center of the computer screen
(see Figure 1).
Ratings. Self-reported CS fear and US expectancy were
assessed for all CSs in separate ratings blocks interspersed between
conditioning trials. These ratings were performed on screen. On a
typical rating trial, the CS was presented centrally, while the
question on fear or US expectancy was situated on top of the CS
and a rating scale was presented below. Before each rating phase,
participants were instructed to respond to the questions that would
appear at the top of the screen through selecting the response
possibility that felt most appropriate to them. Furthermore, it was
stressed that these questions pertained to their most recent encounter
with the CSs during the foregoing (conditioning) phase. In
addition, participants were instructed that ‘‘if you are asked about
your expectancy of the electrical shock, we refer to the actual
shock, not to the picture of the lightning bolt.’’
The questions that appeared were ‘‘How much fear did you
experience when looking at this figure?’’ (self-reported CS fear)
and ‘‘To what extent did you expect an electrical shock while
looking at this figure?’’ (US expectancy). Participants responded
through clicking one of the numbers of a 9-point Likert scale (with
1=none at all/certainly not; 3=very little/rather not; 5= uncer-
tain; 7 = quite some/to some extent; 9=very much/most certain-
ly) using the computer mouse. Numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 of this
scale carried a response label that was presented right above the
number.
Participants indicated US valence and pain on similar 9-point
Likert scales. The questions here asked ‘‘To what extent did you
like the shock?’’ (valence); and ‘‘To what extent did you experience
the shock as painful?’’ (pain).
Electrodermal responding. Specific SCRs were recorded
with a Coulbourn Lablinc V, which was gated to a PC through a
Scientific Solutions DMA card. Signals were digitized through
customized software (Psychophysiological Recording; PSPHR).
Skin conductance was recorded with standard Ag/AgCl electrodes
(0.8 cm diameter) filled with KY-jelly. The electrodes were
attached on the thenar and hypothenar eminences of the non-
preferred hand, which was first cleaned with tap water. The signal
was measured using a constant voltage (0.5 V) coupler, and
digitized at 10 Hz.
The recorded data were analyzed off-line with Psychophysio-
logical Analysis (PSPHA) [27]. For each trial, SCR (in mS) was
calculated by subtracting the mean value of a baseline period (2 s
before CS onset) from the highest amplitude in a 1–8 s time
window after CS onset [28]. To account for individual differences
in response range [29], amplitudes were range corrected using the
largest measured response for that participant during the entire
experiment. Finally, in order to normalize the data [30], range
corrected amplitudes were square root transformed prior to
further analysis.
Questionnaires. All participants completed the trait version
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; [31]; Dutch
translation: [32]). This questionnaire assesses the disposition to
feel anxious and tense through 20 items that are scored on a 4-
point Likert scale.
A short self-made questionnaire that assessed clarity and face
validity of the instructions and demand awareness was adminis-
tered, but only to the second half of our sample. These sixteen
participants were asked to indicate to what extent they thought the
instructions had been clear and credible on a scale ranging from 0
(not at all) to 10 (very much so). In addition, they were asked to
indicate whether there had been any particular instruction that
they thought was less believable than the others. Then, they were
asked to write down the putative goal of the study, to indicate
whether they had considered the goal during the experiment itself
and whether they thought this had affected their performance or
responding in any way.
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Procedure
Preparation. Upon arrival, participants were asked to read
and sign the informed consent form. All participants did so.
Afterwards, they were asked to complete the STAI-trait version
[31]. They were then taken to the experiment room and asked to
wash their hands with tap water. When they were seated in front
of the CRT screen on which the experiment was to be presented,
the experimenter attached the electrodes that would deliver the
shock stimulus. The tolerance level of this stimulus was determined
individually. Next, the electrodes for the measurement of skin
conductance responding were attached to the non-dominant hand.
The skin conductance signal was checked in the adjacent test room
by asking participants to breath in and out deeply. The
experimenter ensured that this was accompanied by a clear rise
and fall in the skin conductance signal. If it was not, the apparatus
was checked and the electrodes were reattached before continuing.
When the skin conductance signal clearly responded to deep
respiration, or when the experimenter had ensured that there were
no technical issues explaining a lack of response, the experiment
commenced.
Start-up. After the preparation phase, participants were
warned that they would be presented with an electrical shock.
This shock was presented while participants were looking at a
blank screen.
After the shock presentation, participants were informed that
three fractal figures (snowflakes) would appear on screen
repeatedly during 8 seconds. Then, they were shown a light
grey-colored slide containing the three fractals during 8 seconds.
Next, they were instructed that two of the fractals would
sometimes be followed by shock, whereas the other fractal would
never (in capital letters) be followed by shock. Subsequently,
participants were alerted that they would see two slides on which
the fractal-shock contingencies would be clearly displayed. They
were asked to closely attend to the contingencies. Then, a slide
containing both CS+ fractals and the text ‘‘+ electrical shock!’’ was
presented during 8 seconds. This was followed by the 8 second
presentation of a slide containing the CS2 fractal and the text
‘‘This figure will never be followed by the shock’’.
Training phase. A training session was announced. Partic-
ipants were informed that this session was meant to familiarize
them with the stimuli and the procedures. Instructions indicated
that the training phase was very similar to the test phase that
would follow, except that some of the electrical shocks would be
replaced by a picture of a lightning bolt. Participants were told that
this was done to prevent them from getting too many shocks
before the experiment would really take off. They were asked to
keep in mind that whenever a lightning bold would be presented,
this meant that in the actual test phase, a real shock would occur.
Then, participants were shown a slide representing the CS+1 (with
shock) and CS+2 (with lightning bolt) contingencies during
8 seconds.
The last page of instructions informed participants that they
would be asked to perform fear and US (shock) expectancy ratings
at regular intervals during the upcoming phase. They were told
that no shocks would be administered during the ratings and asked
to remind the most recent encounter with the fractals while
answering the questions. The experimenter remained present in
the experiment room while participants read through these
instructions to ensure that the instructions were read carefully
and to answer any questions that participants might have. Then,
participants were presented with 27 conditioning trials (9 for each
CS) interspersed with blocked ratings.
Each conditioning trial started with a 4 second presentation of a
fixation cross. Then, the CS+1/CS+2/CS2 was presented for 8 s,
followed by an inter-trial interval of 13, 15, or 17 s (see Figure 1).
On reinforced trials, the US or the placeholder was presented at
CS+ offset. The US was presented for 300 ms. The placeholder
remained on screen for a duration of 500 ms. The CSs were
presented in ‘‘mini-blocks’’ (one mini-block: CS+1, CS+2, CS2) so
that each CS had been presented once before the next mini-block
started. Trial order was randomized within mini-blocks. Blocked
ratings of fear and US expectancy were presented after 9, 18 and
27 conditioning trials (3, 6 and 9 mini-blocks) respectively. As
such, three sub-phases were created within the training phase,
each containing 3 trials of CS+1, CS+2 and CS2. Three out of the
nine CS+1 and CS+2 were reinforced during the training phase.
The first, third, and second to last presentation of the CS+1 was
followed by the US. For CS+2, the first, second, and last
presentation was followed by the placeholder.
Each block of ratings contained 6 ratings (two for each CS). The
order of rating trials within each rating block was fully
randomized. Before the start of each rating block, it was stressed
Figure 1. Overview of a reinforced CS+1 trial, a reinforced CS+2 trial and a CS2 trial. Picture of stimulator signifies delivery of electric shock
(US). Lightning bolt: delivery of US placeholder instead of US.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084888.g001
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that by shock (expectancy), we referred solely to real shocks (i.e.,
not placeholders).
Test phase. Participants again received on-screen instruc-
tions. They were informed that the test phase would start, meaning
that all shocks would be presented for real. Participants were
instructed that the test phase would evolve similarly to the training
phase in all other respects.
The course of this phase was very similar to that of the test
phase, with 27 trials and 3 rating blocks in between. No shocks or
placeholders were presented during this phase.
Post-conditioning phase. Participants completed US pain
and valence ratings on screen. Then, electrodes were removed and
participants were asked to fill out the self-made questionnaire
using paper and pencil. Participants were fully debriefed at the end
of the experiment.
Data-analysis
To examine the effect of merely instruction-based versus
instruction- plus experience-based conditioning on self-reported CS
fear, US expectancy and SCRs, linear mixed effects (LME) model
analyses were performed as implemented in the R package lme-4
(R Development Core Team, 2011). Mean SCRs were used for
each sub-phase of conditioning between ratings (e.g., CS+1
training1: mean value for the three CS+1 trials in the first sub-
phase of the training phase).
For each model, we defined as fixed effect variables the effect-
coded factors phase (training1, training2, training3, test1, test2,
test3) and CS (CS2, CS+1, CS+2) and their two-way interaction.
The grouping variable participant was considered as random factor.
For each model, we decided if by-participant random slopes for
phase and CS were additionally needed using REML-based
likelihood ratio tests [33]. For all three models, better model fits
were obtained by including these by-participants random slopes
for phase and CS. The reported p-values for the fixed effects are
based on Type III ANOVA using a x2-distribution.
Generalized Wald tests on the variance/covariance matrices
were used to test our a priori hypotheses on the response patterns
for CS+1 vs. CS+2 (instruction- plus experienced-based vs. merely
instruction-based conditioning), and on the patterns for CS2 vs.
CS+2 (no conditioning vs. merely instruction-based conditioning).
We contrasted the following conditions for each of our three
outcome variables: the estimated difference in mean SCR, self-
reported fear and US expectancy between CS+1 and CS+2
averaged over the three training sub-phases, between CS+1 and
CS+2 averaged over the three test sub-phases and between CS+1
and CS+2 for test1, test2 and test3 separately. Finally, we
contrasted the CS2 and CS+2 conditions averaged over the three
training sub-phases and averaged over the three test sub-phases.
Alpha was set at .05 for all statistical tests.
Due to a technical error, self-reported fear and US expectancy
ratings were not collected during training3 for 9 participants.
However, by testing LME models, we could account for these
missing values without losing substantial data. Additional analyses
were carried out to examine whether the results were influenced
by participants’ trait anxiety or by their judgment on the clarity
and credibility of the instructions.
Results
Questionnaires
The mean STAI trait score of the sample was 38.19 (SD=9.47)
and ranged between 22 and 59. Participants (n=16) who
completed the self-made questionnaire about instructions and
demand awareness judged the instructions as clear and credible.
On a scale of 0 to 10, the mean clarity score was 9.50 (SD=0.82,
range 7–10) and the mean credibility score was 8.50 (SD=1.83).
There was one participant only who judged credibility as low
(score of 3). All other scores ranged between 7 and 10. Four
participants indicated that there was one instruction they found
less credible than the others. Two of these specified that they ‘did
not believe that electrical stimuli would follow after some stimuli’
but did not specifically indicate which stimuli.
Nine of the 16 participants who answered the self-made
questionnaire assumed that examining the association between
expectation of electrical stimuli and (physiological) responding was
the goal of the experiment. Some mentioned the term condition-
ing. One (other) participants mentioned the goal ‘to examine fear
for stimuli that never really coincide with the electrical stimulus’.
However, none of the participants described the real goal of
experiment. Still, eleven participants indicated that during the
experiment they had been thinking about its goal and seven of
these mentioned that this (thinking about the goal) might have
influenced their performance.
Initial analyses were performed to investigate the effects of trait
anxiety, instruction clarity and instruction credibility. We used a
median split procedure to investigate their effects. These factors
were all were investigated through separate analyses. The analyses
showed that neither trait anxiety nor instruction ratings interacted
with other factors in any of the important analyses. One exception
was a significant effect of instructions credibility at the start of the
training phase. Participants with low credibility scores initially
reported more fear and displayed higher US expectancy for the
CS+2 relative to people with high credibility scores (p,.005).
However, this effect was observed only in the first training sub-
phase. No other effects of instruction credibility were observed.
Trait anxiety, instruction clarity and credibility were therefore
removed from further analyses.
US ratings
The US was rated on Likert scales ranging from 1 to 9, with
higher scores indicating more positive valence and higher
painfulness. The US was rated as moderately negative
(M=3.72, SD=1.84), but not as painful (M=4.88, SD=2.25).
Subjective ratings
Self-reported fear. Significant main effects of both phase
(x2(5) = 19.50, p,.005) and CS (x2(2) = 149.80, p,.001) and a
significant phase x CS interaction (x2(10) = 117.28, p,.001) were
found. The estimated difference in mean fear ratings between
CS+1 and CS+2 averaged over the three training sub-phases was
significant (x2(1) = 120.34, p,.001), with higher levels of reported
fear for CS+1 than for CS+2 (see Figure 2). When averaging across
the three test sub-phases, the estimated difference in mean fear
ratings between CS+1 and CS+2 was also significant, x2(1) = 6.58,
p = .01. During test, CS+1 again elicited higher self-reported fear
than the CS+2. However, further analyses indicated that this
difference was due mainly to the difference in fear ratings on test1,
x2(1) = 12.60, p,.001. That is, no significant differences in
responding to CS+1 and CS+2 were observed on test2,
x2(1) = 2.02, p= .16, or test3, x2(1),1, p= .42 (see Figure 2).
Participants reported more fear for the CS+2 than for the
CS2 during the three training sub-phases (averaged), x2(1) =
28.41, p,.001, and during the three test sub-phases (averaged),
x2(1) = 78.47, p,.001 (see Figure 2).
US expectancy. We observed significant main effects of
phase, x2(5) = 42.16, p,.001, and CS, x2(2) = 289.87, p,.001, as
well as a significant interaction between phase and CS,
x2(10) = 222.52, p,.001. Averaged over the three training sub-
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phases, CS+1 yielded significantly higher US expectancies than
CS+2, x2(1) = 180.71, p,.001 (see Figure 3). During test, in
contrast, no significant difference in US expectancies for CS+1 and
CS+2 was observed, x2(1) = 2.30, p= .13. Further analyses
indicated that there was no difference in mean ratings between
both CS+s for test1, x2(1) = 1.65, p= .20, test2, x2(1) = 1.89, p
= .17, or test3, x2(1),1, p= .46. Again, the difference in
responding between CS+2 and CS2 was significant across
training, x2(1) = 27.19, p,.001, and test, x2(1) = 86.03, p,.001,
with CS+2 yielding higher US expectancies than CS2 (see
Figure 3).
SCRs
Significant main effects of both phase, x2(5) = 15.82, p= .007,
and CS, x2(2) = 14.32, p,.001 were found. The main effect of CS
confirmed the conditioning manipulation: on average, CS+1
elicited higher SCRs than CS+2 and CS2. The main effect of
phase indicated that SCRs generally decreased across sub-phases
(see also Figure 4). The interaction between phase and CS was not
significant, x2(10) = 10.70, p= .38. Still, when the estimated
difference in mean SCR between CS+1 and CS+2 was examined
separately for training (average of three training sub-phases) and
test (average of three test sub-phases), we found a significant
difference in SCR for CS+1 and CS+2 during training,
x2(1) = 13.46, p,.001, but not during test, x2(1),1, p= .57. As
can be seen from Figure 4, SCRs were larger for CS+1 than for
CS+2 during training, whereas the CS+s yielded similar SCRs
during test. Specific contrasts for CS+1 and CS+2 for each of the
test sub-phases separately revealed no differences in responding to
these stimuli, all x2(1),1, all p’s..34.
CS+2 and CS2 elicited similar SCRs during training (average of
three training sub-phases), x2(1) = 1.33, p= .24. During test
Figure 2. Fear ratings for CS2, CS+1 and CS+2 across all experimental phases (tr = training, te = test). Error bars represent the 95-percent
point-wise confidence interval.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084888.g002
Figure 3. US expectancy ratings for CS2, CS+1 and CS+2 across all experimental phases (tr = training, te = test). Error bars represent the
95-percent point-wise confidence interval.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084888.g003
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(average of three test sub-phases), SCRs were significantly larger
for CS+2 than for CS2 , x2(1) = 7.78, p,.01 (see Figure 4).
Comparing the effect of experience on self-reported fear,
US expectancy, and SRC
To test whether self-reported fear, US expectancy, and SCR
were differentially affected by experience, we computed standard-
ized values for these three dependent variables and entered the
scores obtained for the first test phase into a 3 (CS: CS2, CS+1,
CS+2)63 (type of dependent variable: self-reported fear, US
expectancy, SCR) type-III ANOVA using LME models. The 363
ANOVA revealed significant main effects of CS (x2(2) = 97.52,
p,.001) and type of dependent variable (x2(2) = 6.09, p,.05), as
well as a significant two-way interaction between CS and type of
dependent variable (x2(4) = 57.69, p,.001). However, when we
repeated the analysis without including the standardized SCRs,
the two-way interaction between CS and type of dependent
variable was not significant (x2(2) = 5.32, p = .07). When we
excluded the CS2 data from the analysis, the two-way interaction
between CS and type of dependent variable was also not
significant (x2(2) = 3.57, p = .17). These results indicated that
interaction in the original analysis was due to the difference
between the self-report measures on the one hand and SCRs on
the other hand with regard to the CS2 data only, indicating
relatively lower values for the CS2 on the self-report measures
than on the SRC measure. Most importantly, the analyses did not
provide any evidence for a dissociation between different
dependent measures with regard to the effect of direct experience
(as indexed by the difference in responding to CS+1 and CS+2).
Similar analyses for comparing the effect of experience on self-
reported fear, US expectancy, and SCR were performed by
entering the mean scores obtained over the three test phases
(instead of the scores obtained for the first test phase). Results for
both analyses were similar and led to same conclusions.
Discussion
Previous research demonstrated that mere instructions can
install fear [12,26]. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the
combination of instructions and experience leads to more fear
than experience alone [14]. However, the present study is the first
to examine the added value of actual CS-US occurrences on top of
instructions while controlling for CS and US presentations and the
CS’s predictive value. Participants were instructed that during a
test phase, two stimuli (CS+1 and CS+2) would be paired with
shock (US) during test. During the preceding training phase,
however, only CS+1 was paired with the US .
The most prominent finding of our study was the fact that
participants reported more fear for CS+1 than for CS+2 during the
test phase. This observation provides the first demonstration of the
added value of actual CS-US pairings when controlling for
instructions, CS and US presentations, and the predictive value of
the CS. On the other hand, no added value of experience was
observed on the US expectancy and SCR measures. However,
additional analyses did not reveal significant differences between
the measures in the extent to which responses to CS+1 and CS+2
diverged. Although we cannot conclude that different measures
are differentially sensitive to the effect of actual CS-US pairings,
we can conclude that at least the fear measure is sensitive to those
effects.
Before we consider the theoretical implications of the added
effect of experience on self-reported fear, we need to consider the
possibility that this effect was the result of demand compliance.
Although self-reports are highly susceptible to demand compli-
ance, we see at least two reasons why a demand explanation is
unlikely to hold. First, it is unclear why participants would perceive
a demand to report increased fear for CS+1 during test.
Instructions clearly informed the participants that during test,
the probability for the US would be exactly the same for CS+1 and
CS+2. Hence, if anything, participants should perceive a demand
to report equal fear for both CSs. Second, even if the participants
would experience a demand to respond differently to CS+1 than to
CS+2, it is unclear why they would comply to this perceived
demand only when reporting their fear and not when reporting
their US expectancy.
The finding that self-reported fear during test was higher for
CS+1 than for CS+2 can be explained by current models of
associative learning, provided that auxiliary assumptions are
Figure 4. Skin conductance responses for CS2, CS+1 and CS+2 across all experimental phases (tr = training, te = test). Error bars
represent the 95-percent pointwise confidence interval.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084888.g004
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made. First, conditioning models of anxiety disorders can
accommodate this finding but only if it is assumed that actual
CS-US pairings strengthen the CS-US association that had been
developed earlier on the basis of instructions [14,16,18]. Second,
from the perspective of propositional models, enhanced self-
reported fear for the CS+1 could indicate that direct experience is
able to boost the truth value of a proposition that is already very
believable based on instructions. Alternatively, it might be that the
addition of any supplementary source (e.g., experience, prior
knowledge, …; [23]) adds to the truth value of an existing
proposition, given that this additional source provides information
that confirms the nature and truth value of this proposition. In any
case, our study highlights the fact that all existing models of
associative learning are underspecified when it comes to dealing
with the specific effects of experience and instruction. As such, our
findings impose important novel constrains on any future model
that attempts to deal with these issues.
Although our study provides the first evidence for an effect of
CS-US pairings over and above the effect of instructions about
those pairings, one might argue that the added effect of experience
was actually rather limited. However, there are a number of
reasons why our design might have led to an underestimation of
the effect of experience. First, responses to CS+1 might have
reached an asymptotic level during the training phase as a result of
CS-US contingency instructions at the start of training. Partici-
pants rated these instructions as clear and credible. It is therefore
possible that CS+1 responses during training reflected the effect of
CS-US instructions, meaning that there was no more room for a
further increase in responding based on experience. Within this
line of reasoning, similar responses to CS+1 and CS+2 are to be
expected during test because at that point instructions were the
same for both CS+s. Note, however, that self-reported fear and US
expectancy ratings did not approach the maximum score of 9 at
any point in time. Also, the amplitude of SCRs in response to US
only trials at the beginning (announced shock: M= .54, SD= .28)
and at the end (unannounced shock: M= .80, SD= .31) were
significantly larger than CS+1 SCRs (e.g., at the end of the practice
phase: M= .24, SD= .20), t’s.4.80, p’s,.001, which suggest that
also on this measure there was room for further increase in
responding.
Second, responding to CS+2 might have reflected not only
instructions but also experience. More specifically, the pairing of
the CS+2 with a placeholder might have installed some level of fear
conditioning in response to this stimulus, which is confirmed by
elevated self-reported fear and US expectancy ratings for this
stimulus relative to the CS2 during training. On a related note, the
results might at least partially depend on the occurrence of
phenomena such as US rehearsal [34] and/or sensory precondi-
tioning with US inflation [35]. Previous research has shown that
mental rehearsal of the US can maintain conditioned responding
to the CS [34]. In case of the present study, the placeholder might
have served as a type of US rehearsal, which might have
exacerbated responding to the CS+2 during test, when it was
instructed that the US would now be presented for real.
Alternatively, a combination of sensory preconditioning and US
inflation might have augmented CS+2 responding during test. As
shown by White and Davey [35], the pairing between a CS and an
innocuous US (in this case the placeholder) can lead to strong
conditioned responding after the aversiveness of the US has been
inflated. In the current study, US inflation might have occurred
repeatedly through the shock US presentations after CS+1 during
training and through the instructions that announced that all USs
would be presented for real at the start of the test phase. We
believe that the possible role of US rehearsal or sensory
preconditioning with US inflation does not invalidate the claim
that fear conditioning can result from instructions in the absence of
actual CS-US pairings. Instead, these phenomena might explain
how instructions can have this effect. Hence, it would be a fruitful
pathway for future research to look further into the influence of
these phenomena on instructed conditioning. Most importantly for
the present purposes, however, it is possible that the effects of
experience will be bigger in future studies that do not employ a
placeholder.
There is also a third reason why the effect of experience might
have been underestimated. The presentation of written instruc-
tions on a computer screen in the context of an experiment
probably conveys high credibility and gives little reason to doubt
the validity of the instructions. We did indeed observe that
participants were confident that the instructions were correct.
Assuming that the effect of instructions depends on the credibility
of those instructions, it is thus likely that we maximized the effect
of the instructions, therefore leaving less room for an additional
effect of experience.
Finally, the null effects of experience that were observed on the
US expectancy and SRC measures could have been due to a lack
of statistical power. Post-hoc power analyses showed that our tests
had sufficient power to detect medium sized effects (Cohen’s d of
.50) but not small effects (Cohen’s d of .20).
Whereas these four arguments call for caution when interpret-
ing the similarities between the effects of experience and
instructions, they add weight to the observation that experience
did have an impact on self-reported fear. Because we observed this
effect despite a variety of factors that could have counteracted the
effect of experience, we can be quite confident in our conclusion
that experience does contribute to fear conditioning over and
above the impact of instructions.
Apart from revealing differences and similarities between the
effects of experiences and mere instruction, our study also
confirmed that a CS does not have to be paired with the actual
US in order to observe fear conditioning. This observation
confirms previous findings and has important clinical implications
(see Field, 2006 [22], for a discussion on conditioning in the
absence of CS and US). With regard to prevention, this signals the
need to inform parents and teachers on this pathway to fear. It
might be that people intuitively underestimate the impact of
threatening verbal statements or warnings towards children
relative to the actual experience of a threatening event. On the
other hand, our study shows that the experience of CS-US pairings
can have effects over and above the effect of instructions.
One unique aspect of the current study in comparison to
previous studies on fear conditioning via instructions is that we also
gave information about when instructed CS-US relations would
actually occur. More specifically, participants were told that CS+2
would be followed by the actual US only during the test phase.
Interestingly, the relative difference in self-reported fear for CS+2
compared to CS2 was larger at the start of the test phase than at
the end of the training phase. In other words, the effect of
instructions about CS-US parings became stronger at the time that
the pairings were said to occur. This implies that the effect of CS-
US instructions is not merely due to pairing symbolic represen-
tations of the CS and the US during the instructions (i.e., the mere
co-occurrence of words referring to the CS and US in verbal
sentences; see [22]). The effect also seems to depend on the actual
meaning of the instructions, that is the fact information conveyed
in the instruction about when the pairings will actually occur.
Note, however, that during training, we also observed conditioned
responding to CS+2 despite the fact that the instructions clearly
specified that CS+2 could not be followed by the US during that
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phase. It is not clear whether this effect is due to the mere pairing
of CS+2 with a symbolic representation of the US (either the word
‘‘shock’’ in the instructions or the placeholder) or to the fact that
participants somewhat distrusted the validity of instruction that
CS+2 would not be followed by the US during the training phase.
Finally, we also want to point to a limitation of our study.
Because we used a within subjects design, all participants
experienced the US. We therefore do not know whether our
results generalize to situations in which the US is never presented.
For instance, it is possible that threat information or warnings in
real-life situations lead to fear responses only when the US
information refers to a situation that has actually been experi-
enced, or, as suggested by Davey [18], when the threat
information US is revalued at some point (US inflation). It would,
therefore, be interesting for future research to replicate the present
study with a between-subjects design, in which the instructed
group is never actually presented with the relevant US.
In sum, the present study illustrates that, at least with regard to
self-reported fear, actual CS-US pairings add to the effect of clear
instructions on the CS-US contingencies. Our study thus opens up
a new line of research about when and how experience has effects
over and above the effects of instructions. A fruitful option would
be to add dependent variables that could shed some light on the
conditions under which actual CS-US pairings add to the effect of
instructions.
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